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The global crisis burst in 2007 has revived the growth-rebalancing debate and backed 
the position of those advocating a fast reduction of the global imbalances centered on 
the symbiotic US-China relationship. In this work, we develop a two-country two-stage 
growth model reproducing the main features of the Sino-American co-dependency and 
we analyze alternative (medium- and long-term) scenarios for its evolution. We show 
that altering the Chinese exchange rate policy and down-sizing the US external deficits 
with a view to moving the production of tradables toward the US may imply some 
relevant  costs.  If  exchange  rate  and  fiscal  policies  are  not  properly  tuned  in  both 
countries,  the  rebalancing  process  may  lead  to  the  emergence  of  structural 
unemployment in the US (due to the greater labor intensity of growth recorded in the 
nontradable  sector  than  in  the  tradable  sector)  and  to  a  slow-down  in  the  process 
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The accumulation of large current account deficits by the US vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
(usually called global imbalances) has accelerated remarkably in the last decade. The insurgence 
and the persistence of this phenomenon have been widely investigated, and different scholars have 
emphasized specific economic aspects, ranging from the Chinese exchange rate (Blanchard et al., 
2005; Ferguson and Schularick, 2009; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2007) to the extremely high (low) 
saving rates in China (US) (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006; Chamon and Prasad, 2010; Roubini and 
Setser,  2004),  from  the  lack  of  sound  non-US  investment  opportunities  after  the  Asian  crisis 
(Caballero et al., 2008; Cooper, 2006; Mendoza et al., 2009) to the emergence of a global saving 
glut (Bernanke, 2005 and 2007).
1 
Our  paper  looks  at  global  imbalances  as  the  product  of  the  different  growth  models 
characterizing the US, on the one hand, and many developing countries, on the other hand.  In 
particular, we focus on the symbiotic relationship between the US and China, well captured by the 
“Sino-American co-dependency” view proposed by Dooley et al. (2003, 2004a,b, 2009). According 
to this view, China has purposefully maintained an undervalued exchange rate (mainly against the 
US dollar) to promote its exporting sectors, to  foster its economic  growth and to facilitate the 
mobilization of its labor force into the highly productive sectors of the economy.
2,3 To this end, 
China has progressively accumulated and (partially) sterilized a huge amount of foreign reserves.
4 
                                                 
1 See Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009), Eichengreen (2006), Fracasso (2007) and Obstfeld (2010) for an overview. 
2 While China accounted for about 20% of US current account deficits in the early 2000s, this share has reached almost 
40% in the last few years. In 1994/1995, the Chinese authorities abolished exchange rate controls on current account 
transactions,  unified  the  exchange  rate  and  started  pegging  the  renminbi  to  the  US  dollar.  Besides  boosting  the 
expansion of the tradable sector, this strategy helped China to anchor its domestic price level. In 2005, a managed float 
with reference to a basket of eleven currencies substituted the hard peg to the dollar: the Chinese currency gradually 
appreciated, passing from 8.28 RMB per dollar in 2005 to 6.8 RMB per dollar until July 2008 (see Ferguson and 
Schularick,  2009;  Frankel,  2009;  Frankel  and  Wei,  2007).  Since  mid-2008,  as  a  response  to  the  crisis  and  to  the 
temporary appreciation of the dollar against most currencies, the Chinese authorities have de facto started pegging the 
currency to the dollar again (see Fratzscher, 2009). 
3 The  surplus  labor  employed  in  the  agricultural  sector  ranges  between  100  and  200 million  people,  according  to 
Lipschitz et al. (2009). Surplus labor helps accounting for the limited wage growth observed in China over time (see 
Baldacci et al., 2010). On the interaction between exchange rate policy, capital account management and growth see 
Levy-Yayati and Sturzenegger (2009), Montiel and Serven (2008) and Rodrik (2008). 
4 According  to  Prasad  and  Sorkin  (2009),  Chinese  current  account  surpluses  accounted  for  91%  of  the  huge 
accumulation  of  exchange  rate  reserves  occurred  from  2004  to  2008.  Reserves  accumulation,  pursued  for  both 2 
The US, in turn, has exploited the Chinese willingness to finance its current account deficits to 
maintain high domestic consumption, while ensuring low interest rates, low yields on US Treasury 
bonds, and subdued inflation.  
The  crisis  burst  in  2007  has  revealed  some  of  the  latent  costs  of  this  tacit  bilateral 
arrangement and has revived the so-called growth-rebalancing debate by reinforcing the position of 
those advocating the reduction of the imbalances by means of coordinated policy changes both in 
the  US  and  in  China.  Against  those  pointing  to  the  unsustainability  of  the  global  imbalances 
centered on the US-China relationship, however, one can also find those arguing that down-sizing 
the US deficits and altering the Chinese exchange rate policy might have non-negligible undesirable 
consequences on both countries. Such policy changes would reduce the room for China’s export-led 
growth  strategy  and,  as  we  shall  endeavor  to  show,  might  jeopardize  the  maintenance  of  full 
employment and high levels of consumption in the US. As shown in Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2009), the adjustment process may bring both countries (and the world) on a lower trajectory of 
growth. 
The  negative  implications  of  a  correction  in  the  Chinese  policy  mix  on  the  economy’s 
longer-term  growth  prospects  (and  on  the  ongoing  structural  change  driven  by  the  export-led 
growth) have already been discussed in the literature: as China’s buoyant growth has been largely 
due  to  the  rapid  transition  to  producing  tradable  manufacturing  goods,  an  abrupt  and  untimely 
abandonment of the export-led model of growth may turn out to be premature for China, which 
remains a developing country, albeit a fast growing one (see, for instance, Bonatti and Fracasso, 
2009; Hua, 2007; McKinnon 2006,2007; McKinnon and Schnabl, 2009; Rodrik, 2009a,2009b).
5 
Much less attention has instead been paid to the impact that serious changes in the countries’ 
models of growth (undertaken with a view to reducing their bilateral imbalances) may have on the 
US.  Our  paper  aims  to  fill  this  gap  in  the  literature  and  to  contribute  to  the  debate  on  global 
                                                                                                                                                                  
mercantilist  and  self-insurance  purposes,  has  made  China  the  largest  holder  of  foreign  reserves  in  the  world  (see 
Aizenman  and  Lee,  2008  and  Jeanne  and  Ranciere,  2008).  Chinese  total  foreign  reserves  reached  $2.4  trillion  in 
December 2009, accounting for 30% of global reserves. In particular, China’s holdings of UST securities passed from 
$60 billion in 2000 up to $400 in 2006, and reached $800 billion in August 2009 (according to Brad Setser and Simon 
Johnson these figures could largely underestimate the actual share of US Treasury in Chinese hands due to the large 
Chinese purchases through non-Chinese intermediaries). On the contrary, despite favorable valuation effects and capital 
gains (see Tille, 2008 and Gourinchas and Rey, 2007), the US has become the largest debtor in the world. 
5 Other  studies,  in  fact,  advocated  a  rapid  rebalancing  of  the  Chinese  growth  away  from  external  demand  and 
investment, and toward domestic demand and consumption (see Aziz, 2006; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006; Guo and 
N’Diaye, 2009b; Kuijs and Wang, 2006; Lardy, 2006; Makin, 2006; Prasad, 2009; Prasad and Rajan, 2006; Straub and 
Thimann, 2009; Zheng et al., 2009). According to these works, the costs for China coming from the maintenance of the 
current strategy are larger than those stemming from a policy switch. 3 
rebalancing. Many scholars have argued that global rebalancing cannot be successful unless the US 
ultimately increases its savings (see Baldwin and Taglioni, 2009; Bergsten, 2009a,b; Frankel, 2006; 
Posen, 2009) and China revises its mercantilist exchange rate policy and appreciates the renminbi. 
We do not question these recommendations. Rather, we caution that re-orienting the US economy 
from domestic demand toward exports may eventually bring about a relative shrinking of the labor-
intensive nontradable sectors, which have prospered in the last decades and that employ most of US 
workers. Notwithstanding a rich literature on the employment effects of exchange rate adjustments, 
the impact of an appreciated renminbi on overall US employment has not been addressed yet.
6 To 
our  knowledge,  thus,  this  is  the  first  work  investigating  the  medium-  and  long-term  potential 
consequences of an adjustment process in which, on the one hand, China revaluates the currency 
and slows down its accumulation of US debt, and, on the other hand, the US moves away from 
domestic demand and toward tradable manufacturing products. 
Notably, we accept the common tenet that an appreciation of the Chinese currency (either 
stemming from a one-off revaluation or deriving from the switch to a flexible exchange rate regime) 
tends to move the production of tradables toward the US. However, we show that, provided that the 
labor intensity of growth is larger in the nontradable than in the tradable sector, the shift toward US 
tradables produces (ceteris paribus) two effects. On the one hand, it boosts capital accumulation 
and long-run growth in the US tradable sector; on the other hand, it may determine the emergence 
(or the expansion) of structural unemployment as the employment gains in the tradable sector may 
not be sufficient to offset the losses in the nontradable sector. Similarly, we show that changing the 
pattern (i.e. size and sectoral allocation) of government expenditures in the US and in China may 
contribute to growth-rebalancing, but also affect structural (un)employment in the US. 
The  assumption  that  the  nontradable  sector  in  the  US  is  more  labor  intensive  than  the 
tradable sector is adopted also by Cova et al. (2009) and finds empirical support. Using the data 
from the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts (November 2009 Release) discussed in 
O’Mahony  and  Timmer  (2009),  we  calculate  the  share  of  compensation  accruing  to  labor  and 
capital  services  (average  values  over  the  period  2000-2007)  for  the  various  sectors  of  the  US 
economy: the shares accruing to labor in the nontradable service sectors (that account for three 
quarter of US employment) range between 70% and 90%, while the average shares in the tradable 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors amount, respectively, to about 65% and 55%. It is worth 
                                                 
6 Among the studies assessing the effects of exchange rate appreciations on employment in the manufacturing sectors 
see Burgess and Knetter (1998), Campa and Goldberg (2001), Gourinchas (1999), Klein et al. (2003), Marquis and 
Trehan (2010), and Revenga (1992). 4 
noting that, despite some heterogeneity across industries, nontradables appear to be labor intensive 
also in China (see Guo and N’Diaye, 2009a and Cova et al., 2009).
7 
This paper provides an original analytical setup able to reproduce several aspects of the 
“Sino-American  co-dependency”  story  and  broadly  consistent  with  the  available  evidence.  We 
present a two-stage growth model that allows the evaluation of alternative (medium- and long-term) 
scenarios  of  the  evolution  of  the  Sino-American  relationship  and  of  growth-rebalancing. 
Accordingly, the first stage (Phase 1) is characterized by an interaction similar to that described by 
Dooley  and  co-authors:  the  US  runs  current  account  deficits  against  China,  whose  authorities 
accumulate foreign reserves so as to keep the exchange rate at a level that guarantees the continuous 
growth of external demand and the absorption into the most productive sectors of the working 
population employed in the least productive ones. The second stage (Phase 2), instead, reflects two 
possible scenarios that can materialize, depending on whether China liberalizes the capital account 
and floats its currency. In Scenario A, the Chinese authorities never liberalize the capital account 
and never float the renminbi, which remains undervalued with respect to the US dollar. Within this 
Scenario, a trade-off is likely to emerge as a result of a permanent appreciation of the Chinese 
currency:  in  the  long  run,  the  US  rate  of  real  GDP  growth  tends  to  increase,  but  structural 
unemployment  in  the  US  may  arise  (or  expand)  because  of  the  contraction  of  the  nontradable 
(labor-intensive) sector. This permanent appreciation has controversial effects also for the Chinese 
economy: consumption is less compressed, but capital accumulation is lower and the full absorption 
of the Chinese manpower in the modern sectors of the economy may take more time. In Scenario B, 
we consider the possibility that the Chinese authorities liberalize the capital account and let the 
exchange rate float once that all Chinese manpower has been absorbed in the modern sectors of the 
economy. As in Scenario A, this regime switch raises the US long-run growth, but it may also 
generate (or expand) structural unemployment in the US. 
The results of the paper may help understanding the reluctance of the Chinese ruling elite to 
abandon  its  successful  export-led  growth  strategy,  as  it  is  signaled  by  its  current  refusal  of 
accelerating the appreciation of the renminbi versus the US dollar. In other words, our paper may 
contribute to explain why the Chinese leadership seems to be willing to reassess its development 
strategy only to the extent that this is made inevitable by the gradual restriction of the possibility for 
China  to  rely  on  external  demand  to  feed  its  growth.  Our  paper,  in  parallel,  emphasizes  the 
difficulties that the US policy-makers may face while seeking to re-orient the economy away from 
                                                 
7 According to Thorbecke and Zhang (2009), only 21% of the Chinese exports fall in the class of labor intensive 
industries. The situation in China is different from that in most developing countries, which are often characterized by a 
relatively higher labor intensity in the manufacturing (tradable) industries (Loayza and Raddatz, 2009). 5 
domestic consumption and toward exports: this rebalancing may bring about a relative shrinking of 
those labor-intensive nontradable sectors that provide most jobs, thus worsening the prospects of 
US employment. 
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The building blocks and the derivation of 
the model are discussed in section 2, while the characterization of the equilibrium path is presented 
in section 3. Section 4 is dedicated to growth dynamics under the abovementioned three policy 
scenarios. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
  The  world  economy  includes  two  countries,  US  and  China.  Three  market  goods  are 
produced in this world economy: an internationally tradable good that is produced in both countries, 
an (internationally) nontradable good that is produced and sold in the US, and an (internationally) 
nontradable  good that is produced and sold in  China. Hence, in both countries there are firms 
specialized  in  the  production  of  tradable  goods  and  firms  specialized  in  the  production  of 
nontradable goods. The tradable good is used as capital in the production of both goods and as 
consumption good, while the nontradable good can be only consumed.
8 Each country has its own 
government sector. Labor is internationally immobile but can freely move across sectors within 
each  country.
9 In  the  US,  labor  that  is  not  employed  in  the  two  market  sectors  receives  an 
unemployment benefit paid by the government. In China, labor that is not employed in the two 
market sectors is employed in the non-market sector of the economy (one can interpret this non-
market sector as consisting of low-productive activities that people undertake if they cannot be 
employed profitably in the market economy). Goods and labor markets are perfectly competitive. 
Both countries are populated by households that supply labor, buy the consumer goods, accumulate 
financial assets and hold money. Two policy regimes governing the world financial markets are 
considered. Under the first regime, the Chinese authorities fix the nominal exchange rate and only 
official transactions in financial assets  are permitted. The second regime is implemented if the 
Chinese authorities decide to liberalize the capital account and to let the nominal exchange rate float 
consistently with the two countries’ policies and market fundamentals. 
                                                 
8 As argued by Turnovsky (1997), there is no agreed conclusion on the share of tradables and nontradables in total 
investment. For some evidence on the issue, see Bems (2008). 
9 The distinction between two main sectors (tradables and nontradables) and the assumption that labor is mobile across 
sectors but not across countries while the capital good is mobile both across sector and countries are consistent with the 
standard trade model developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Chapter 4. We extend this framework by introducing a 
technological spillover in both sectors. The latter replaces the assumption of exogenous productivity improvements and 
generates endogenous growth.   6 
  Finally,  time  is  discrete  and  the  time  horizon  is  infinite.  There  is  no  source  of  random 
disturbances and agents’ expectations are rational (in the sense that they are consistent with the true 
processes followed by the relevant variables), thus implying perfect foresight.  
Firms producing the (internationally) nontradable good 
In each country j, j=us, ch, there is a large number (normalized to be one) of identical firms, 
which—in each period t—produce the nontradable good YjNt. This good is not storable and must be 
immediately consumed.
10 Firms produce YjNt according to the following technology:  
1 0   , L K A Y j jNt
- 1
jNt jNt jNt
j j < < = g
g g
,                       (1) 
where KjNt and LjNt are, respectively, the capital stock and the labor input used in country j to 
produce the (internationally) nontradable market good YjNt, and AjNt is a variable measuring the 
state  of  technology  of  the  firms  operating  in  that  sector  of  country  j  which  produces  the 
(internationally) nontradable good YjNt. It is assumed that AjNt is a positive function of the capital 
installed in the sector of j which produces YjNt: 
j
jNt jNt K A
g
= .
11 This assumption combines the idea 
that learning-by-doing works through each firm’s capital investment and the idea that knowledge 
and productivity gains spill over instantly across all firms (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
Therefore, in accordance with Frankel (1962), it is supposed that although AjNt is endogenous to the 
economy, each firm takes it as given, since a single firm’s decisions have only a negligible impact 
on the aggregate stock of capital of the nontradable sector.
12  
  In each t, the net profit (cash flow) pjNt of the representative firm producing nontradables is 
given by: 
pjNt=PjNtYjNt-WjtLjNt-PjTtIjNt, IjNt³0,      (2) 
where PjNt and PjTt are, respectively, the price of the nontradable good and the price of the tradable 
good in country j at time t, Wjt is the nominal wage in country j at time t, and  IjNt is capital 
investment by the representative firm producing nontradables in country j at time t.   
  The capital stock installed in the nontradable sector evolves according to 
KjNt+1=IjNt+(1-δj)KjNt,  0£ δj £1,  KjN0 given.         (3) 
                                                 
10 Typically, consumer services are consumed while they are produced. 
11 Consistently with this formal set-up, one can interpret technological progress as labor augmenting. 
12 This amounts to say that technological progress is endogenous to the economy, although it is an unintended by-
products of firms’ capital investment rather than the result of purposive R&D efforts. 7 
  In each t, firms decide on { }
¥
= + 0 n n jNt L  and { }
¥
= + 0 n n jNt I  subject to (3) in order to maximize 
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where  1 ) i (1
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+ , and ijt is the nominal interest rate in country j at time t. 
Firms producing the (internationally) tradable good 
In each country j, there is a large number (normalized to be one) of identical firms producing 
the (internationally) tradable good YjTt. In each period t, these firms produce YjTt according to the 
following technology:  
j j jTt
- 1
jTt jTt jTt 0   , L K A Y
j j g a
a a < < = ,                       (5) 
where KjTt and LjTt are, respectively, the capital stock and the labor input used in country j to 
produce the (internationally) tradable market good YjTt, and AjTt is a variable measuring the state of 
technology of the firms operating in that sector of country j which produces the (internationally) 
tradable good YjTt. Notice that it is assumed that the labor elasticity of output is larger in the sector 
producing nontradables than in the sector producing tradables. Finally, AjTt is a positive function of 
the capital installed in the sector of j which produces YjTt: 
j
jTt jTt K A
a
= . 
  In each t, the net profit pjTt of the representative firm producing tradables is given by 
p jTt=PjTtYjTt-WjtLjTt-PjTtIjTt,    IjTt³0,             (6) 
where IjTt is capital investment by the representative firm producing tradables in country j at time t.   
  The capital stock installed in the tradable sector evolves according to 
KjTt+1=IjTt+(1-δj)KjTt,  0£ δj£1,  KjT0 given.         (7) 
  In each t, firms decide on { }
¥
= + 0 n n jTt L  and { }
¥
= + 0 n n jTt I  subject to (7) in order to maximize 
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Households   
  Households are infinitely lived. Their large number living in country j is normalized to be 
one. Consumption, real money balances providing liquidity services and a public good provided by 
the government enter the period utility function of the representative household of country j, ujt:  
0 '   0,    ), G (
P
M
ln ) C ln( u j jt
jt
jt








+ = v v c c ,            (9) 
where Mjt and Pjt are, respectively, the household’s nominal money holdings and the consumer 
price index in country j at time t, Cjt is the consumption index for the households located in country 
j at time t, and Gjt is the amount of public good provided by the government of country j in t. The 
consumption index is defined as 
1 0    , C C C j
- 1
jTt jNt jt
j j < < = h
h h
,       (10)                                      
where CjNt and CjTt are, respectively, the  consumption of nontradables  and the  consumption of 
tradables by the  representative household located in country j  at time t. Notice that Cjt can be 
interpreted as a composite good. Given (10), PjNt and PjTt, the consumer price index Pjt is obtained 














h h º = .               (11) 
  The representative household’s period budget constraint is:  
BjHt+1+EjtFjHt+1+Mjt+PjNtCjNt+PjTtCjTt£(1+ijt)BjHt+(1+iit)EjtFjHt+Mjt-1+πjNt+πjTt+LjtWjt+  
+(Hj-Ljt)Sjt-Tjt,                           BjH0, FjH0 and Mj-1 given, i≠j, (12) 
where BjHt are the domestic financial assets accumulated during period t-1 by the representative 
household of country j and carried over into period t with nominal yield ijt, Ejt (Ejt=1/Eit) is the 
nominal exchange rate of country j at time t (the price in units of the j-country’s currency of one 
unit of the i-country currency at time t), FjHt are the foreign financial assets (denominated in foreign 
currency) accumulated during period t-1 by the representative household of country j and carried 
over into period t with nominal yield iit, Ljt are the units of labor worked by the representative 
household of country j in period t, Hj is the fixed time endowment of each household located in 
country j, Sjt is a benefit paid by the government to unemployed labor of country j in t, and Tjt are 
the  net  monetary  transfers  (“net  taxes”)  from  the  representative  household  of  country  j  to  its 
government in t. Notice that in each period the representative household of country j is entitled to 
receive the net profits earned by the firms located in its own country as dividend payments. It 9 
should  be  also  apparent  that  nominal  balances  (no-interest  bearing  financial  assets)  Mjt  are 
accumulated during period t and carried over into period t+1 because of the liquidity services that 
they provide to the households. 
  To rule out the possibility that households borrow arbitrary large sums, we impose the usual 
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  The amount of labor supplied by the representative household of country j in period t is 


















jt       (14) 
where Vjt is the reservation wage for households located in j at time t. One could argue that in the 
US this reservation wage is proportional to the government’s benefit paid to unemployed labor, 
while in China it depends on labor productivity in the non-market sector of the economy, which 
may  be  interpreted  as  a  traditional  sector  where  low-productive  technologies  are  utilized  for 
subsistence consumption
13 (it can be considered a proxy of China’s primary sector). Thus, it is 
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  (15) 
In (15), we account for the possibility that the US households would prefer to stay at home if the 
level of the unemployment benefit were the same as the market wage (jus is a parameter capturing 
                                                 
13 The net utility that the representative household gets by undertaking the non-market activities is assumed to be zero. 10 
the households’ disutility of working), and that some technological progress occurs in the Chinese 
non-market sector (the rate at which labor productivity grows in this sector is exogenously given).
14  
  In  each  t,  households  located  in  country  j  decide  on  { }
¥
= + 0 v
s
v jt L ,  { }
¥
= + + 0 v v 1 jHt B , 
{ }
¥
= + + 0 v v 1 jHt F ,{ }
¥
= + 0 v v jt M , { }
¥
= + 0 v v jNt C  and { }
¥
= + 0 v v jTt C  subject to (12), (13) and (14)  in order to 








j 1 0    , u q q ,                 (16) 
where θj represents the subjective discount factor of country j’s households. 
Government sectors  
  In  each  period  t  the  government  of  country  j  produces  the  public  good  Gjt  combining 
nontradable and tradable goods according to: 
 Gjt=min(GjNt, ζjGjTt),   ζj>0,                    (17) 
where GjNt and GjTt are, respectively, the quantity of nontradable good and the quantity of tradable 
good that the government of country j buys in t to produce the public good. Since it is assumed that 
the  government  produces  efficiently,  (17)  implies  that  GjNt=ζjGjTt  (the  parameter  ζj  can  be 
interpreted as a purely technological parameter  or as a parameter reflecting the choice that the 
government of country j does concerning the characteristics of the public good that it intends to 
provide).
15 
  Hence, in each period t, the government of country j has to decide the fraction gjt of the 
country’s GDP to be spent for the production of the public good: 
    PjNtGjNt+PjTtGjTt=gjt(PjNtYjNt+PjTtYjTt),  0£ gjt<1.               (18) 
In each t, the government of country j must satisfy its period budget constraint:  
              BjGt+1+EjtFjGt+1+(Hj-Ljt)Sjt+gjt(PjNtYjNt+PjTtYjTt)£Mjt-Mjt-1+Tjt+(1+ijt)BjGt+Ejt(1+iit)FjGt,   
BjG0, FjG0 and Mj-1 given,  i≠j,   (19) 
where  BjGt  are  the  domestic  financial  assets  accumulated  during  period  t-1  by  the  j-country’s 
government sector and carried over into period t with nominal yield ijt, and FjGt are the foreign 
                                                 
14 In China, nominal wages have increased over time in all sectors, but those in the manufacturing sector have grown 
faster than in the primary sector: the ratio between wages in the manufacturing and primary sector was equal to 1.38 in 
1997 and reached 1.88 in 2007. This legitimates our choice of treating the average primary sector wage as reservation 
wage for the Chinese workers. 
15 For an alternative way of modeling government spending, see Monacelli and Perotti (2008). 11 
financial assets (denominated in foreign currency) accumulated during period t-1 by the j-country’s 
government sector and carried over into period t with nominal yield iit.  
  The  unemployment  benefit  is  set  by  the  US  as  a  fraction  of  nominal  GDP,  while  for 
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Equations (15) and (20) make the reservation wage of both countries adjust over time. In particular, 
equation (20) is instrumental to capturing the fact that in an advanced country the opportunity cost 
of households’ time tends to increase in the long run with the population’s income. 
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Markets equilibrium conditions 
  Markets for labor and for the nontradable good are purely domestic. In equilibrium, the labor 





> entailing  Ljt=LjNt+LjTt=Hj,  or  by 





= . Equilibrium in the country j’s market for the nontradable 
good requires: 
YjNt=CjNt+GjNt.        (22) 
  The market for the tradable good is internationally integrated. Equilibrium in this market 
requires: 
YusTt+YchTt=CusTt+CchTt+GusTt+GchTt+IusNt+IusTt+IchNt+IchTt.        (23) 
  In this internationally integrated market, the one-price law must hold:   
PjTt=EjtPiTt,  i≠j,                     (24) 





jt M M = .                     (25) 
  Equilibrium in the world markets for financial assets requires 12 
 BusHt+BusGt+FchHt+FchGt=0,                     (26) 
and 
    BchHt+BchGt+FusHt+FusGt=0.                      (27) 
Policy regimes governing the world financial markets 
  We consider two possible scenarios for the world economy. Both scenarios share an initial 
phase (“phase 1”) starting at t=0 in which some Chinese labor is still employed in the backward 
sector  of  the  economy  and  the  Chinese  authorities  impose  capital  controls  so  as  to  keep  their 
currency undervalued in order to accelerate economic growth. As in period t*>0 China manages to 
absorb all its manpower in the modern sectors of the economy, phase 2 begins. In phase 2, the 
Chinese authorities can opt to maintain capital controls and an undervalued currency (Scenario A), 
or they can fully liberalize the capital account and let the exchange rate float (Scenario B).  
  In both phases, the US authorities decide on { }¥
=0 t ust s , on fiscal policy by setting { }
¥
=0 t ust g  




M - M + º m ,  1 - j j q m > .
16  Similarly,  the  Chinese  authorities  set  { }
¥
=0 t cht g  and  ch m .
  When the Chinese capital account is not liberalized, the only international transactions in 
financial assets that take place are those operated by the Chinese authorities, which decide on the 
time path of Et (the nominal exchange rate). Consistently, under this regime, the Chinese authorities 
let their foreign asset holdings (“foreign reserves”) adjust so as to accommodate the flows of funds 
generated by this mix of policies. In other words, this policy regime is characterized by (26), (27), 
FusHt=FusGt=FchHt=0,                           (28) 
and  
) (1 E E E
t
1 s
1 - s ch0 cht cht Õ
=
+ = = e ,  1 ) (1
0
1 s
1 - s = + Õ
=
e ,                      (29) 
where ch0 E (the level of the nominal exchange rate in period 0) and the time path of et (the crawl 
rate of the exchange rate) are both decided by the Chinese authorities. Notice that (28)—together 
with (26) and (27)—entails BusHt+BusGt+FchGt=0 and BchHt+BchGt=0: the Chinese accumulation of 
foreign reserves is the counterpart of the US negative net foreign asset position, and under this 
                                                 
16 The condition  1 - j j q m >  is necessary for insuring that real money holdings in country j increase asymptotically at 
the same rate as KjTt and KjNt. 13 
regime it is assumed that the Chinese net holdings of domestic assets are equal to zero.
17 Hence, 
when the Chinese capital account is not liberalized, China’s foreign reserves evolve according to 
                                FchGt+1-FchGt=iustFchGt-TAust,                                  (30) 
 where  TAjt≡PjTt(YjTt-CjTt-GjTt-IjNt-IjTt)  is  the  trade  account  of  country  j  (denominated  in  j 
currency)  at  time  t.  By  considering  (26)  and  (28),  one  can  see  that  (30)  can  be  written  as 
BusHt+1+BusGt+1=(1+iust)(BusHt+BusGt)+TAust,  which  is  the  consolidated  (government+private 
sector) balance sheet of the US economy under this policy regime: given the Chinese authorities’ 
willingness to accumulate foreign reserves, it is immaterial how the US external debt is divided up 
according to government and private sector net liabilities. 
  If in period t* the Chinese authorities opt for an irreversible regime switch, they liberalize 
the  capital  account  and  the  nominal  exchange  rate  floats  consistently  with  the  two  countries’ 
policies  and  market  fundamentals.  Hence,  under  this  new  regime,  the  interest-parity  condition 
holds: 
      ) i (1
E
E
) i (1 ust
1 - cht
cht
cht + = + ,                    (31) 
and the Chinese authorities set the maximum amount of US trade deficit—as a fraction ξ of US 
GDP—that  they  are  willing  to  finance  in  each  period  by  maneuvering  their  foreign  reserves.
18 
Therefore, China’s net foreign asset position (denominated in US currency) evolves under this new 
regime according to 
FchHt+1+FchGt+1-Eust(FusHt+1+FusGt+1)-[FchHt+FchGt-Eust-1(FusHt+FusGt)]=           
=iust[FchHt+FchGt-Eust-1(FusHt+FusGt)]-TAust,       (32) 
where TAust≥-ξ(PusNtYusNt+PusTtYusTt), ξ≥0. 
Summarizing,  the  regime  with  full  capital  mobility  and  floating  exchange  rate  is 
characterized by (26), (27), (31) and (32). Finally, it is worth to emphasize that also under this 
                                                 
17 Typically,  the  People’s  Bank  of  China  seeks  to  compensate  the  accumulation  of  foreign  reserves  by  selling 
sterilization bills to domestic agents, so as to keep control over money supply. As a result of this kind of operations, it is 
normally the case that the government sector reduces its holdings of domestic assets, while private agents increase 
theirs. However, for our purposes, it is not necessary to model the specific modalities whereby the Chinese central bank 
controls the supply of money while accumulating foreign reserves. What is essential for us is that an increase in the 
government sector’s holdings of foreign assets has its counterpart in an improvement of the country’s trade account.  
18 There are alternative ways for setting the limit to the size of the US external deficit that the Chinese authorities are 
willing to finance (for instance, by setting a limit to the US current account deficit as a fraction of China’s GDP). 
However, in a two-country setup it is not relevant how this external constraint imposed on the US is formulated: for 
simplicity and analytical convenience we opt for the formulation contained in the text. 14 
regime the possibility for the US to run a persistent external deficit rests ultimately on the Chinese 
authorities’ willingness to finance it. 
    
3.   CHARACTERIZATION OF AN EQUILIBRIUM PATH 
  Using the market equilibrium conditions and solving the agents’ optimization problems (see 
the Appendix for the derivations), we obtain the system of equations governing the equilibrium path 
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.       (44) 
It is easy to verify that equation (33) is derived from the equilibrium condition of the world market 
for the tradable good (23) by using (5) and (7). Equations (34) and (35) give us the amounts of 
tradables that are purchased in equilibrium, respectively, by the households and by the government 
of  country  j.  Equation  (36)  governs  the  equilibrium  trajectory  of  the  ratio  between  the  capital 
installed in the US tradable sector and that installed in the Chinese tradable sector.
20 Equation (37) 
                                                 
19 Along an equilibrium path, the real rate of interest,  1 -
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20 It should be noticed that KjTt and KjNt can be considered as, respectively, the stock of capital per household in the 
tradable sector of country j and the stock of capital per household in the nontradable sector of country j.  16 
shows—together with (38)—that the rate of growth of the capital installed in the tradable sector of 
country j depends in any t>0 on the quantities of labor that j devotes to the production of tradables 
and nontradables both in t and in t+1. In (38), one can see the relationship linking, in each country j, 
the evolution of the capital installed in the nontradable sector to that of the capital installed in the 
tradable sector. Notice that the rate of growth of the capital installed in the nontradable sector of 












+ + + = r . In (39), 
one can check that the possibility for country j to employ all its manpower in the two market sectors 
of the economy depends crucially on its endowments of capital in both sectors relatively to its 
reservation wage (again, consistently with the stylized facts, it is reasonable to assume that at time 0 
China employs some of its labor in the traditional sector of the economy, while in no period this is 
the case for the US). The law of motion of the Chinese ratio between the reservation wage and the 
capital installed in the tradable sector is given by (40). Equation (41) is derived from the one-price 
law (24) and gives the equilibrium level of the nominal exchange rate of country j. In equation (42), 
one has the equilibrium level of the nominal interest rate in country j, which is constant since the 
rate of money growth is fixed in both countries. Equation (43) states that in equilibrium the relative 
price of the nontradable good in terms of the tradable good must equalize the ratio between the 
marginal productivity of labor in the production of tradables and the marginal productivity of labor 
in the production of nontradables. Finally, equation (44) gives the equilibrium level of the trade 
account of country j.  
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It is apparent in (45) that unemployment emerges in the US whenever LusTt exceeds the threshold 
) - ( s
) H s - (
 
us us us ust
us us ust us us
a g j
j g a
, and that beyond this threshold total unemployment increases with LusTt. 
This reflects the fact that the labor elasticity of output—and consequently the elasticity of labor 
demand with respect to the product wage—is larger in the nontradable sector than in the tradable 
sector    ) ( us us a g > . Hence, in the presence of full employment, an increment in  LusTt must be 
                                                 







<  is necessary in order to insure that one may have full employment at 
equilibrium. 17 
accommodated  in  equilibrium—other  things  remaining  equal—by  a  relatively  large  fall  in  the 
product wage of the tradable sector, while the offsetting decrease of LusNt is accompanied by a 
relatively  small  increase  in  the  product  wage  of  the  nontradable  sector.
22 Therefore,  as  LusTt 
approaches the threshold
) - ( s
) H s - (
 
us us us ust
us us ust us us
a g j
j g a
, the consumer wage tends to become closer to the 
workers’ reservation wage. Moreover, in the presence of unemployment, the consumer wage is 
equal  to  the  workers’  reservation  wage  and  an  increment  in  LusTt  is  accompanied  by  a  larger 
increase in the product wage of the nontradable sector than that occurring with full employment, 
thus determining a more than offsetting fall in LusNt. In sum, having assumed that the labor intensity 
of growth is larger in the nontradable sector, an increase in LusTt requires a change in relative prices 
that tends to be detrimental for total employment. Finally, one can show that along an equilibrium 










 (see the Appendix): a re-
balancing of employment away from the nontradable sector and towards the production of tradables 
is paralleled by a reduction of the relative importance of private consumption as a source of demand 
for domestic output.    
   
4.   GROWTH DYNAMICS UNDER DIFFERENT POLICY REGIMES 
    We examine the growth dynamics of the world economy under the hypothesis that at time 0 
China—differently than the US—employs some of its labor in the backward sector of the economy. 
This amounts to assume that the initial endowments KchT0 and KchN0 are relatively low with respect 
to Vch0 (see (39)). The objective of accelerating economic growth can possibly justify the Chinese 
policy to set the time profile of the nominal exchange rate. Under this policy, equation (29) can be 
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.                           (46) 
One can easily see from (46) that—by keeping their currency undervalued with respect to the US 
currency—the Chinese authorities compress the Chinese consumption of tradables relatively to that 
of the US (this compression of the Chinese consumption of tradables is consistent with the stylized 
facts documented in the Introduction). By using (34), (38) and (39) for substituting CjTt, KjNt and 
                                                 
22 Notice  that  in  equilibrium  the  increment  in  LusTt  is  accompanied  by  a  reduction  of  the  relative  price  of  the 
nontradables in terms of tradables. 18 
LjNt, one can also verify that equation (46) defines implicitly the level of employment in the US 
tradable sector as a function of LchTt, LchNt, Zt, gcht, sust, gust, , Echt us m  and  ch m : 
) , , E , g , s , g , Z , L , L ( L ch us cht ust ust cht t chNt chTt usTt m m e = .
23                   (47) 
One can see in equation (47) that when the Chinese authorities set the nominal exchange rate, 
systematic monetary policies in US and in China can affect the dynamics of the real variables. This 
is  not  the  case  when  the  nominal  exchange  rate  can  float  consistently  with  the  two  countries’ 
policies and market fundamentals: monetary policies have no effect on real variables. Under this 
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  We may capture the China’s policy of keeping its currency undervalued so as to maintain the 
Chinese tradables relative cheap with respect to the US tradables by setting  
1 - us ch us us us
0 1 - ch us ch ch ch
ch0 M ) - 1 ( ) - (1
Z M ) - 1 ( ) - Q(1
E
c h q m
c h q m
+
+
= ,  Q>0      (49) 
and  
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= ,                         (50) 
where Q is a constant whose value is decided by the Chinese authorities (it measures the degree of 
“aggressiveness” of the mercantilist strategy adopted by the Chinese authorities: a larger Q means 
that—other things being equal—the Chinese currency is maintained more undervalued with respect 
to the US currency). Notice that as Zt decreases, that is as China reduces its gap relatively to the US 
in terms of capital per household in the tradable sector, the Chinese authorities let their currency 
gradually appreciate, but preserving the price competitiveness of the Chinese tradables relatively to 
the US tradables. 
  Given (36), (46), (49) and (50), one can rewrite (47) as (see the Appendix) 
  0   , 0    ), Q , g , s , g , L , L ( L
ust g Q ust ust cht chNt chTt usTt < < = f f f .
24              (51) 
Equations (48) and (51) allow us to state that the Chinese currency is undervalued any time that 
t Q Q > , where  t Q  is that value of Q such that  ) Q , g , s , g , L , L ( ) (L ust ust cht chNt chTt chTt f l = : any time 
                                                 
23 At time 0, the level of employment in the US tradable sector depends also on the initial endowments of capital KchT0, 
KusT0, KchN0 and KusN0. 
24 At time 0, the level of employment in the US tradable sector depends also on the initial endowments of capital KchT0, 
KusT0, KchN0 and KusN0. 19 
that  t Q Q > , the US employment in the tradable sector is lower than its equilibrium level under a 
floating exchange-rate regime.    
  We  consider  two  possible  scenarios  for  the  world  economy  depending  on  whether  the 
Chinese authorities decide to fully liberalize the capital account and let the exchange rate float once 
that all its manpower has been absorbed in the modern (market) sectors of the economy. The two 
scenarios have in common phase 1. 
Phase 1 
  The equilibrium trajectory of the real variables is governed for 0<t<t* (phase 1) by three 
difference equations in LchTt, Ncht and Zt (see the Appendix):  
(52)         , Q Q     , 0 ) g ˆ , N , L , N , L (                                                                         
Q) , g ˆ , g ˆ , s ˆ , N , L , N , L ( Z ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , s ˆ , N , Z , L , N , L (
t ch cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt
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t ch us us cht t chTt 1 cht 1 t 1 chTt Q Q    , 0 ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , s ˆ , N , Z , L , N , Z , L ( > = F + + + ,              (53) 
0 ) g ˆ , N , L , N , L ( ch cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt = Q + + .
25                                   (54) 
Equations (52) and (53) are derived, respectively, from (33) and (36) by using (34), (35), (37), (38), 
(39) (with  LusNt=h(LusTt, us s ˆ ) and  chTt ch chTt cht
chTt
chNt
chNt L - H L , N ,
K
K
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(54)  is  derived  from  (40)  by  using  (34),  (35),  (37),  (38)  and  (39)  (again,  with 
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= L ). Notice that we assume for simplicity and without loss 
of  generality  that  in  phase  1  policy  variables  do  not  change  ( us ust s ˆ s = ,  us ust g ˆ g =  and  ch cht g ˆ g =  
* t t < " ). 
  From  (52)-(54)  we  have  that  Q  (the  degree  of  aggressiveness  of  the  mercantilist  policy 
undertaken  by  the  Chinese  authorities)  affects  the  dynamics  of  the  real  variables.  Moreover, 
equations (42) and (49)-(50) show that having decided on Q the Chinese authorities can still choose 
their preferred combination of (equilibrium) level of the nominal interest rate and level (and time 
profile) of the nominal exchange rate: given  us m  (the US rate of nominal money growth), there is a 
continuum of combinations of  ch m  and  cht E  that are consistent with a given Q. Similarly, if the US 
authorities implement a more (less) inflationary monetary policy by setting a higher (lower)  us m , 
the Chinese authorities may keep the dynamics of the real variables and their nominal interest rate 
                                                 
25 At time 0, the dynamics of the economy depends also on the initial endowments of capital KchT0, KusT0, KchN0 and 
KusN0 (see the Appendix). 20 
unchanged by fixing their nominal exchange rate at a lower (higher) level and letting it appreciate at 
a higher (lower) rate. 
  The fact that in phase 1 the dynamics of the world economy depends also on Ncht reflects the 
presence in China during this phase of some labor which is still employed in the backward sector of 
the economy. As in period t* all Chinese labor is absorbed in the modern sectors of the economy, 
phase 2 begins.   
Phase 2 (Scenario A) 
  In scenario A, the Chinese authorities never liberalize the capital account and never let the 
exchange rate float, even if from period t*>0 onwards China employs its entire manpower in the 
modern sectors of the economy. In this case, the equilibrium trajectory of the real variables of the 
world economy is governed for t³t* by two difference equations in LchTt and Zt (see the Appendix): 
   , Q Q   , 0 ) g , L , (L                                                                           
) Q , g , g , s , L , (L Z ) Q , g , g , s , Z , L , L (
t ch chTt 1 chTt







(55)    
    
t ch us us t chTt 1 t 1 chTt Q Q    , 0 ) Q , g , g , s , Z , L , Z , L ( > = C + + .           (56) 
Equations (55) and (56) are obtained, respectively, from (33) and (36) by using (34), (35), (37), (38), 
(39) (with LusNt=h(LusTt, us s ) and  chTt ch chNt  L - H L = ) and (51), where for simplicity and without loss 
of generality it is assumed that  us ust s s = ,  us ust g g =  and  * t t g g    ch cht ³ " = . It is significant that—
in  this  scenario—long-run  growth  depends  also  on  Q,  namely  on  the  exchange-rate  policy 
conducted by the Chinese authorities.   
  Some propositions concerning long-run growth hold in Scenario A. 
Proposition  1  The asymptotic rate of real GDP growth of country j increases with LjT, where 
jTt t jT  L lim L
¥ ® =  is the asymptotic equilibrium level of employment in the tradable sector of country j.   
Proof:  If  LjTt→LjT  as  t→∞,  then  the  country  j’s  rate  of  real  GDP  growth  approaches 
1 - ] - 1 L ) - (1 [ j
j
jT j j j d a q r
a
+ = , where   jt
t
j   lim r r
¥ ®







  Proposition 1 is a consequence of the fact that the long-run rate of real GDP growth is a 
function of the marginal productivity of capital in the production of tradables, since the production 
process of all market sectors of the economy requires capital goods that are typically tradables (e.g. 
equipment  and  machinery),  and  technological  progress  is  driven  by  the  accumulation  and 
installment of capital.  
                                                 
26 As shown in the Appendix, LjTt→LjT as t→∞ implies that  jt
t jt GDP
t
  lim   lim r r
¥ ® ¥ ®
= . 21 
  Since by pegging their exchange rate the Chinese authorities affect the difference between 
LusTt and LchTt, they can set  t E so as to have higher long-run growth in China than in the US: 
Proposition  2 Supposing that in the long run China tends to grow faster than the US, China’s 
asymptotic rate of real GDP growth depends on its fiscal policy. Moreover, China displays a higher 
asymptotic rate of real GDP growth than the US if its exchange rate is maintained sufficiently 
undervalued, i.e., if  Q Q > , where the threshold Qdepends on the structural and policy parameters 
of the two countries (αch, αus, γch, γus, ηch, ηus, θch, θus, δch, δus, Hch, Hus, ζch, ζus, jus,  ch g ,  us s ,  us g ).  
Proof: See the Appendix.   
  It should be stressed that the pegging of the exchange rate by the Chinese authorities may 
not be necessary to insure that the asymptotic rate of real GDP growth is higher in China than in the 
US: the structural and policy parameters of the two countries may be sufficient to guarantee higher 
long-run growth in China, without the need of keeping its exchange rate artificially undervalued 
(see Proposition 7 below). The relationship linking the asymptotic rate of real growth of the country 
growing faster in the long run to its fiscal policy is captured by the following Proposition: 
Proposition 3 Supposing that in the long run China tends to grow faster than the US ( Q Q > ), 
China’s asymptotic rate of real growth increases with  ch g , namely with the fraction of its GDP 
devoted to the provision of the public good, if the latter is produced by using a relatively small 
proportion of nontradable good, i.e., if ζch is below a critical threshold  ch z  depending on αch, γch, 
ηch, θch, δch and Hch. The opposite is true if ζch is relatively large: if  ch ch z z > , a larger fraction of 
GDP spent for producing the public good in China (that is a larger  ch g ) depresses China’s long-run 
real growth. If ζch is close to  ch z , a change in  ch g  has little effect on China’s long-run real growth 
(in the special case in which  ch ch z z = , a change in  ch g  has no effect on long-run real growth). 
  Proof: See the Appendix. 
  Long-run real growth in China (the country which has the higher asymptotic rate of growth) 
is sensitive to both the fraction of its GDP devoted to public expenditures and the composition of 
public expenditures (the mix of tradables and nontradables purchased by the government). This 
result reflects the fact that fiscal policy can affect the composition of aggregate demand and shift 
domestic  production  towards  the  sector  producing  tradables,  thus  feeding  long-run  growth  (see 
Proposition 1). Finally, notice that—as ζch is very close to the threshold  ch z —changes in China’s 
fiscal policy have very little effect on its long-run real growth. 
Proposition 4 Supposing that the asymptotic rate of real GDP growth is higher in China than in the 
US  ( Q Q > ),  a  permanent  appreciation  of  the  Chinese  currency  (a  lower  Q)  boosts  the  US 22 
asymptotic rate of real GDP growth, but it may generate structural unemployment (or increase the 
volume of structural unemployment) in the US. 
Proof: See the Appendix.     
  It  is  intuitive  that  the  appreciation  of  the  Chinese  currency  moves  some  production  of 
tradables towards the US, thus increasing LusT. As we know from Proposition 1, this increase boosts 
long-run growth in the US. However, as we know from equation (45) and related discussion, the 
increase in LusT may be accompanied by the emergence of some structural unemployment (if the 
long-run equilibrium associated with the initial value of Q exhibits full employment), or it can 
increase the volume of structural unemployment (if the long-run equilibrium associated with the 
initial value of Q is characterized by the presence of unemployment). It is straightforward that this 
unpleasant effect of an appreciation of the Chinese currency can be eliminated or mitigated by a 
reduction  of  the  US  workers’  reservation  wage,  which  can  be  brought  about  by  a  cut  in  the 
unemployment benefit (a lower  us s ).   
Proposition 5 Supposing that the asymptotic rate of real GDP growth is higher in China than in the 
US ( Q Q > ), a permanent decrease in the fraction of the US GDP devoted to the provision of the 
public good (a lower  us g ) boosts the US asymptotic rate of real GDP growth, but it may generate 
structural unemployment (or increase the volume of structural unemployment) in the US. 
Proof: See the Appendix.     
  A fall of government consumption allows the US to increase capital accumulation and the 
relative weight of the sector producing capital goods (i.e., the tradable sector). As a result, long-run 
growth is boosted in the US, but the shrinking of the nontradable sector may be detrimental for total 
employment. 
For studying the transitional path along which the world economy moves from period t* 
onwards in Scenario A, we linearize the system (55)-(56) around (LchT, Z=0) under the assumption 
that  Q Q > , where  t t Z   lim Z
¥ ® = . The linearized system thus obtained has only one path converging to 





















=                                    (57) 
,
















          (58) 23 
where all the partial derivatives 
t Z P , 
chTt L P , 
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P , 
t Z C  and 
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C are evaluated at (LchT, Z=0) 
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¥ ®
= (see  the  Appendix).  Considering  (57),  this  implies  that—along  the  transitional 
path—LchTt>LchT if and only if TAus<0: along the transitional path, China’s employment in the 
tradable sector is higher than its long-run level whenever the US tends asymptotically to run a trade 
account deficit. It is not surprising that this deficit is associated with an aggressive exchange-rate 
policy on the part of the Chinese authorities: 
 Proposition 6 The US tends asymptotically to run a trade account deficit (TAus<0) whenever the 
Chinese currency is kept sufficiently depreciated. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
  Numerical  examples  also  show  that  a  more  depreciated  Chinese  currency  tends  to  be 
associated with a faster accumulation of capital and absorption of the entire Chinese manpower in 
the modern sectors of the economy, and thus with a shorter phase 1: a larger Q may lower t* (see 
the Appendix). In this way, the model captures an important reason that is often mentioned to 
explain why the Chinese authorities are willing to keep their currency systematically undervalued 
and to finance the persistent US trade deficit, thus compressing Chinese consumption. Conversely, 
these examples show that an appreciation of  the Chinese currency tends to prolong phase 1 and 
may increase (or generate) unemployment in the US also along the transitional path: the US trade 
deficit shrinks and the employment level rises in the US tradable sector, but not enough to offset the 
decline of employment in the US sector producing nontradables. Thus, a trade-off tends to emerge 
for the US also along the transition path: an appreciation of the Chinese currency boosts the US 
tradable sector and raises the US rate of growth, but the structural change made necessary to meet 
the different composition of demand may have a negative net impact on US total employment.   
Phase 2 (Scenario B) 
  In scenario B, the Chinese authorities liberalize the capital account and let the exchange rate 
float  in  period  t*>0.  In  this  case,  the  equilibrium  trajectory  of  the  real  variables  of  the  world 
economy is governed for t³t* by two difference equations in LchTt and Zt (see the Appendix): 
0 ) g , L , L ( ) g , s , L , L ( Z ) g , g , s , Z , L , L ( ch chTt 1 chTt us us chTt 1 chTt t ch us us t chTt 1 chTt = + = Y + + + o u , (59)    
     0 ) g , g , s , Z , L , Z , L ( ch us us t chTt 1 t 1 chTt = L + + ,                            (60) 
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Equations (59) and (60) are obtained, respectively, from (33) and (36) by using (34), (35), (37), (38), 
(39)  (with  ) s , (L L us usTt usNt h =  and  chTt ch chNt L   - H L = )  and  (48).  The  inequality  (61)  reflects  the 
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Proposition 1 holds even in Scenario B. Furthermore, in Scenario B one has:  
Proposition 7 Asymptotically, the real GDP of the country whose households are less impatient, 
say China (θch>θus), grows at a higher rate.  





usT us - 1 L ) - (1 - 1 L ) - (1 d a d a
a a + = + , thus implying that us ch r r >  since θch>θus.  
  Proposition 7 implies that if we treat the US as the relatively impatient country (θus<θch), 
consistently with the evidence in favor of a lower propensity to save for US households relative to 
their European and Asian counterparts (see Ghironi et al., 2008), under a floating exchange rate and 
no capital control one should expect higher long-run real growth in China than in the US and Z=0. 
Maintaining that the Chinese households are less impatient than their US counterparts (θch>θus), 
Proposition 5 holds also in Scenario B, together with: 
Proposition 8 If θch>θus, the abandonment by the Chinese authorities of the exchange-rate regime 
of Phase 1 (namely, an exchange-rate pegging implying a systematic undervaluation of the Chinese 
currency) in favor of the regime characterizing Scenario B (namely a regime in which the exchange 
rate  floats  freely  in  response  to  market  fundamentals  and  government  policies)  raises  the  US 
asymptotic rate of real GDP growth, but it may generate structural unemployment (or increase the 
volume of structural unemployment) in the US. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
  The intuition underlying Proposition 8 is very similar to that discussed while commenting 
Proposition  4,  since  the  abandonment  of  the  exchange-rate  pegging  brings  about  a  permanent 
appreciation of the Chinese currency. 
Proposition 9 If θch>θus, a reduced willingness on the part of the Chinese authorities to finance the 
US external deficit (a lower x) may force the US to lower  us g , namely the fraction of its GDP 
devoted to public expenditures in tradable and nontradable goods, if the latter are disproportionally 25 
dedicated to the purchase of tradables, i.e., if ζus is below a critical threshold  us z . The opposite is 
true if ζus is relatively large: if  us us z z > , a smaller  us g can further increase the US long-run trade 
deficit. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
  Proposition 9 is a consequence of the fact that, if the US public consumption is relatively 
more intense in tradables than private  consumption, a reduction of the  US public consumption 
(which increases US households’ disposable income) improves the US trade account. 
  Also in the case of Scenario  B, one can capture why the Chinese authorities may be 
willing  to  finance  a  structural  US  external  deficit  and  to  accumulate  foreign  reserves  forever, 
namely that may explain why ξ>0, by studying the transitional path along which the world economy 
moves from period t* onwards. For studying this transitional path, we linearize the system (59)-(60) 
around (LchT, Z=0) under the assumption that θch>θus. The linearized system thus obtained has only 
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 (see  the 
Appendix). Considering (62), this implies that—along the transitional path—LchTt>LchT if and only 
if TAus<0. The same remarks made while discussing the analogous result obtained from the analysis 
of the transitional path in Scenario A apply here.   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
   
Our two-country two-stage growth model captures the symbiotic relationship linking the US 
to China in recent years, provides an analytical setup able to reproduce several aspects of the “Sino-
American co-dependency” story that are broadly consistent with the available evidence, and helps 26 
to analyze alternative (medium- and long-term) scenarios for the evolution of the Sino-American 
relationship.
27 Hence, this work contributes to the debate on global growth-rebalancing, a process 
that, according to most scholars, the recent economic and financial crisis has made more likely and 
desirable. 
The  first  stage  of  the  model  (Phase  1)  reproduces  the  Sino-American  co-dependency 
emerged in the last decade. The Chinese leaderships maintains an undervalued exchange rate vis-à-
vis the US dollar aiming to boost the country’s exporting sectors and to mobilize part of rural 
workers into the industrial sectors. In so doing, China runs persistent and large current account 
surpluses that lead to the rapid accumulation of a huge stock of foreign reserves (most of which 
denominated in US dollars). The US, in turn, exploits the Chinese willingness to finance its current 
account deficits in order to keep high households’ consumption. 
The second stage of the model (Phase 2) reflects two possible scenarios that can materialize, 
depending on whether the Chinese authorities liberalize the capital account and float the renminbi, 
once that all the Chinese labor force employed in the backward sectors of the economy has been 
mobilized in the most productive sectors. We summarize below the main results described and 
discussed in the main text of the paper and in the Appendix. 
In Scenario A, China never liberalizes the capital account and never floats the currency. As 
long as the domestic currency remains undervalued with respect to the dollar, the long-run rate of 
real  GDP  growth  in  China  is  i)  greater  than  in  the  US  and  ii)  depends  on  the  size  and  the 
composition  (in  terms  of  the  relative  share  of  tradables  and  nontradables)  of  Chinese  public 
expenditures. Provided that the labor intensity of growth is larger in the nontradable sector than in 
the tradable sector, a more appreciated Chinese currency leads to a structural adjustment of the US 
economy toward the production of tradables, thus reducing the US trade deficits and raising the 
long-run US growth. However, the employment gains in the tradable sector may not be sufficient to 
offset the job losses in the nontradable sector. In this way, structural unemployment may emerge (or 
expand) in the US.  
It is worth noticing that the undervaluation of the renminbi in Phase 1 guarantees that US 
consumption and production of nontradables remain high, and leads to a faster accumulation of 
capital in China, thereby reducing the time necessary to absorb the Chinese manpower into the 
productive sectors of the economy. A more appreciated Chinese currency tends to lengthen this 
                                                 
27 To keep the model tractable, we deliberately neglect some aspects (which represent avenues for future research), such 
as the features of the financial sectors in the US and in China, the role played by third countries in growth-rebalancing, 
the  implications  of  processing  trade  and  different  invoicing  strategies,  and  the  different  behavior  of  privately  and 
publicly owned companies in China. 27 
period, thus jeopardizing the achievement of full labor mobilization in China
28 and possibly creating 
US unemployment also during the transition path.
29 
In  Scenario  B,  the  Chinese  authorities  fully  liberalize  the  capital  account  and  let  the 
exchange  rate  float  once  complete  labor  mobilization  has  occurred.  This  switch  amounts  to  a 
permanent  appreciation  of  the  Chinese  currency  generating  effects  that  are  similar  to  those 
considered in the previous Scenario. If the Chinese authorities reduce the extent to which they are 
willing to finance the US deficits, the US policy-makers would be forced to change their fiscal 
policy  depending  on  the  composition  of  government  spending  in  terms  of  tradables  and 
nontradables. 
Some general questions are raised by our  analysis. To what extent can a change in the 
Chinese  exchange  rate  regime  alone  be  beneficial  to  both  US  growth  and  employment  in  the 
medium and long term? Is the re-orientation of the US economy toward tradable manufacturing 
sectors conducive to a desirable redistribution of the US labor force across sectors? Can the Chinese 
and American authorities use exchange rate and fiscal policies to engineer an adjustment process 
that does neither jeopardize the  growth prospects of the Chinese  economy nor cause structural 
unemployment problems in the US? 
This model suggests that the maintenance of the Sino-American co-dependency has both 
served the growth and labor mobilization goals of China and allowed the US households to enjoy a 
high level of consumption. However, this has come at the cost of a persistently subdued level of 
domestic  consumption  in  China  and  of  an  increasing  dependence  of  the  US  on  the  Chinese 
willingness to finance its external deficits.
30 Our analysis shows that redressing global imbalances 
may imply some relevant costs. If exchange rate and fiscal policies are not properly tuned in both 
                                                 
28 In a companion paper (see Bonatti and Fracasso, 2009), we show that a premature appreciation may even prevent 
forever the complete absorption of the Chinese manpower into the modern sectors. 
29 We consider here neither population nor labor force growth rates. In fact, a decline in the US population rate of 
growth and in the labor force participation rate (as argued in Feldstein, 2009) might mitigate the rise in unemployment 
due to sectoral reallocation of demand. 
30 China  has  maintained  a  high  degree  of  domestic  financial  repression  in  order  to  facilitate  the  sterilization  of 
mounting foreign reserves and to drive the allocation of domestic investment across alternative uses. In addition, to 
preserve its export-driven model of growth, China has accepted very limited monetary policy independence and, despite 
its efforts to the contrary, a certain degree of capital misallocation. The US, on its part, has progressively increased its 
dependence on the willingness of the Chinese authorities to finance the US external deficits by accumulating even more 
dollar-denominated  US  Treasuries.  Moreover,  its  manufacturing  sector  has  progressively  declined,  while  exotic 
financial activities have prospered, facilitating the emergence of excess liquidity and overleveraging, as much as the 
persistence of very low households’ savings (see, in this, Obstfeld, 2010). 
 28 
countries,  the  rebalancing  process  may  lead  to  the  emergence  of  transitional  and,  eventually, 
structural unemployment in the US and to a slow-down in the process whereby the Chinese labor 
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1 Derivation of the equations characterizing an equilibrium path  
1.1 From firms’ first-order conditions with respect to labor, we get:    
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One can use (A1) and (A2) to obtain equation (43). Moreover, by using (A1) to obtain the labor demanded 
by each firm producing YjNt, the intertemporal problem of the representative firm producing nontradables 
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1.3  By  using  (14)  to  obtain  the  labor  supplied  by  each  household,  the  intertemporal  problem  of  the 




























































} ] C P - C P - M - F E - B - T - M W L v jTt v jTt v jNt v jNt v jt 1 v jHt v jt 1 v jHt v jt 1 - v jt v jt v jt v jTt + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +p with 
respect to CjNt, CjTt, Mjt, BjHt+1, FjHt+1 and the Lagrange multiplier ljHt, and then by eliminating ljHt, thus 
obtaining: 
jNt jNt j jTt jTt j C )P - 1 ( C P h h = ,                (A9) 
1 -




jt j j ) C (P - ) C (P ] )M - 1 [( + + = q h c ,               (A10) 
) i (1 C P C P 1 jt jTt jTt j 1 jTt 1 jTt + + + + =q ,                           (A11) 
* t   t j, i    ), i (1 E C P C P E 1 it 1 jTt jTt jTt j 1 jTt 1 jTt jTt ³ ¹ + = + + + + q ,         (A12) 
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) F )(F i (1 E ) B )(B i (1 - ) F (F E B B
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+ + =
+ + + + + +
d
      (A13) 
Notice that (A13) is obtained by using (19) (the government’s budget constraint) for substituting Tjt in the 
household’s budget constraint, and by using (2), (3), (6), (7), (18),(21) and (22).   
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.               (A16) 
Finally, one can use (43) and the production functions (1) and (5) to rewrite (A16) as (35). 
1.5 To derive (34), one can use GjNt=ζjGjTt, the equilibrium condition (22), the production function (1) and 
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= .                            (A18) 
Finally, one can use (A17) to rewrite (A18) as (34). 
1.6 To derive (38), one can use (A1) and the fact that 
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Similarly, one can use (A2) and the fact that 
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,      (A20) 
Finally, one can use (43), (A19) and (A20) to obtain (36).  













                                  (A21) 
Finally, one can use (34) to rewrite (A21) as (37). 











³ . Furthermore, 





>  entails LjTt+LjNt=Hj, which—in its turn—implies 
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 entails LjNt=Hj-LjTt. 
Thus,  
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.  (A22)    
Finally,  jt - 1

































= (again, consider (11), (14), (43) and (A2)). 
Thus, one can use (A1) and (43) to obtain  
jt - 1




































































.         (A23) 
1.9 To derive (41), rewrite (A10) as  36 
-1
jTt jTt jt jt
1 -
j j 1 jt jt
-1
j j ) C P ( M x    , ) (1 x - x ) - 1 ( º + = + m q h c ,              (A24) 
Since  1 ) (1
-1
j < + m q , equation (A24) is such that if xj0>xj then xjt→∞ as t→∞, if xj0<xj then xjt→-∞ as 
t→∞, if xj0=xj then xjt=xj  for all t, where









= . Therefore, the only value of xjt that is 
consistent  with  the  optimality  and  boundary  conditions  is  xjt=xj    for  all  t.  This  implies  that  along  an 













m q m h + +
= = .                   (A25) 
Considering (A25), one can use the one-price law (24) to obtain (41). 
2 Derivation of equation (48) 
Considering (31) and (A11), one can check that  
j i    ,
C C P P
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Considering (24), one has 
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.                                   (A27) 
Thus,  (A26)  and  (A27)—together—imply  that  under  a  floating  exchange-rate  regime  one  has 
j i    , 1
C C
C C
iTt 1 - jTt j




 which in its turn  entails (48) (see equation (A21)).   
3 Derivation of equation (51) 










= .                                            (A28) 
By using (34), (38) and (45), (A28) becomes 
( ) ( ) 0,  t , g , L , L ), L , L ( Q g , L ), s , L ( ), L ), s , L ( ( cht chTt chNt chTt chNt ust usTt ust usTt usTt ust usTt > = K C h h K C (A29) 
from  which  one  can  obtain  LusTt  as  an  implicit  function  of  ust ust cht chNt chTt g   , s   , g   ,  L , L  and  Q: 
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In particular, one can check that  ( )
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, thus entailing  0 Q < f  and  0
ust g < f .   
4 Derivation of equations (52)-(54) 
To derive the system (52)-(54), consider that  ( ) * t t 0   , L - H L , N ), L , L ( L chTt ch chTt cht chTt chNt chNt < < < = K L  
(see equations (38) and (39)), from which one obtains 37 
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Equation  (52)  contains 
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is  obtained  by  setting  ) Q , g ˆ , s ˆ , g ˆ ), L , N ( , L ( L us us ch chTt cht chTt usTt n f =  (see  equation  (51)), 
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while  ) g ˆ , N , L , N , (L ch cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt + + J is obtained by setting    ) L , N ( L chTt cht chNt n =  (see equation (A30)) 
and  t     g ˆ g g ch 1 cht cht " = = +  such that 0<t<t* in  
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In their turn, equations (A31) and (A32) are derived by using (34), (35), (37), (38) and (45).  
Equation (53) is obtained by  setting  ) Q , g ˆ , s ˆ , g ˆ ), L , N ( , L ( L us us ch chTt cht chTt usTt n f = ,  us ust 1 ust s ˆ s s = = + ,   
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a ,  t>0,     (A33) 
where (A33) is derived from (36) by using (34), (35), (37), (38) and (45).   
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In its turn, equation (A34) is derived from (40) by using (34), (35), (37) and (38).  
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 and Nch0 are given. 
5 Derivation of equations (55)-(56) 
Equation (55) contains 
usTt usTt
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- ) g , L , (L = + o ,  where  ) Q , g , g , s , L , (L ch us us chTt 1 chTt+ s  is  obtained  by  setting 
) Q , g , g , s , L - H , L ( L ch us us chTt ch chTt usTt f = ,  us ust 1 ust s s s = = + ,  us 1 ust ust g g g = = +  and 
* t t    g g g ch 1 cht cht ³ " = = + in (A31), while  ) g , L , (L ch chTt 1 chTt+ o is obtained by setting  chTt ch chNt  L - H L =  
and  * t t    g g g ch 1 cht cht ³ " = = +  in (A32). 
Equation  (56)  is  obtained  by  setting  chTt ch chNt  L - H L = ,  ) Q , g , g , s , L - H , L ( L ch us us chTt ch chTt usTt f = , 
us ust 1 ust s s s = = + ,  us 1 ust ust g g g = = +  and  * t t    g g g ch 1 cht cht ³ " = = +  in (A33). 39 
6 Proof  that  if  LjTt→LjT  as  t→∞,  then  in  Scenario  A  the  country  j’s  rate  of  real  GDP  growth 
approaches  1 - ] - 1 L ) - (1 [ j jT j j j
j d a q r
a + = , where   jt
t
j   lim r r
¥ ®
=   
Considering (1), (5), (11), (37), (38) and (43), one can verify that the country j’s rate of real GDP growth is 
given in Scenario A by  
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 By  inspecting  (A38),  one  can  easily  check  that  LjTt→LjT  as  t→∞  implies  that  jt
t jt GDP
t
  lim   lim r r
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= . 
Finally,  by  considering  (37)  and  (38),  one  can  also  check  that  LjTt→LjT  as  t→∞  implies  that 
1 - ] - 1 L ) - (1 [   lim j jT j j j jt
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a + = =
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. Thus, LjTt→LjT as t→∞ entails   
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7 Proof of Proposition 2 
To verify that, if in the long run China tends to grow faster than the US, China’s asymptotic rate of real GDP 
growth depends on its fiscal policy, consider that if China’s asymptotic rate of real GDP growth is higher 
than the US asymptotic rate of real GDP growth, one must have ρch>ρus (see the proof of Proposition 1). In 






t ® º  as t→∞. Hence, as t→∞, equation (55) becomes    
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a .(A39) 40 
The asymptotic equilibrium level of employment in China’s tradable sector is a value of LchTÎ[0,Hch] that 
satisfies (A39). If it exists, this asymptotic equilibrium level is unique. Indeed, in the special case in which 
δch=1, there is at most one value of LchTÎ[0,Hch] satisfying (A39): in this case, the equilibrium level of 
employment in China’s tradable sector is this unique value of LchT. In the case in which δch<1, there are at 
most two values of LchTÎ[0,Hch] satisfying (A39) and the asymptotic equilibrium level of employment in 
China’s  tradable  sector  exists  if the  values  of  LchTÎ[0,Hch]  satisfying  (A39)  are  two.  In  this  case,  the 
equilibrium level of employment is the largest of these two values and it is unique, since the smallest value 
cannot be an equilibrium because it is inconsistent with  t   0 I I chTt chNt " ³ + . Thus, given that the asymptotic 
equilibrium level of employment of China’s tradable sector is a value of LchT satisfying (A39) and it is 
unique, this equilibrium level is a function of China’s structural parameters and of  ch g : 
 LchT=p( ch g ).                                               (A40) 
Hence, if China’s long-run growth is higher than US long-run growth, the asymptotic level of employment of 
China’s tradable sector is given by (A40) and China’s asymptotic rate of real GDP growth is given by 
1 - - 1 ] ) g ( )[ - (1 ch
ch
ch ch ch ch   
   + = d a q r
a
p , which depends on  ch g . 
To verify that China displays a higher asymptotic rate of real GDP growth than the US if  Q Q > , consider 
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. Given (51), this implies 
that ρch>ρus if and only if  
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.   (A41) 
By using (A40), one can rewrite the inequality (A41) as  
Q). , g , s , g ), g ( - H ), g ( (
) - (1
) - 1 ( - ] - 1 )] g ( )[ - (1 [
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  (A42)  
Since  0 Q < f , the inequality (A42) holds for all  Q Q > , where Q is that value of Q satisfying 
Q). , g , s , g ), g ( - H ), g ( (
) - (1
) - 1 ( - ] - 1 )] g ( )[ - (1 [
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  (A43)  
Considering (A29), (A39) and (A43), one can check that Q depends on αch, γch, ηch, θch, δch, Hch, ζch,  ch g , 
αus, γus, ηus, θus, δus, Hus, ζus, jus,  us s  and  us g . 
Finally, notice that if  Q Q >  one has ρch>ρus, implying that LchT=p( ch g ).  
8 Proof of Proposition 3 41 
If China’s asymptotic rate of real GDP growth is higher than the US asymptotic rate of real GDP growth, one 
must  have  ρch>ρus,  where  1 - - 1 ] ) g ( )[ - (1 ch
ch
ch ch ch ch   
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. To verify 
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From (A44), (A45) and (A47)—together—one can conclude that  42 
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Furthermore,  consider  that  w(LchT, ch g )=w(LchT, 0
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.  This  allows  us  to 
conclude from (A46), (A47) and (A48) that  0
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 becomes smaller as ζch becomes closer 
to  ch z , thus reducing the effect of a change in  ch g  on the asymptotic rate of real GDP growth.  
9 Proof of Proposition 4 
 Since  0   Q), , g , s , g ), g ( - H ), g ( ( L Q us us ch ch ch ch usT < = f p p f ,  and  1 - ] - 1 L ) - [(1 us
us
usT us us us d a q r
a
+ = , 










. Considering that the US asymptotic 












 that the US long-run equilibrium may be characterized by some unemployment brought about by 
the  decrease  in  Q  (if—as  a  result  of  the  decrease  in  Q—LusT  overpasses  the  threshold 
) - ( s
) H s - (
 
us us us us
us us us us us
a g j
j g a ), or by an increased volume of unemployment (if—at the initial value of Q—LusT 
already exceeds the threshold 
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10 Proof of Proposition 5 
Since  0   Q), , g , s , g ), g ( - H ), g ( ( L
us g us us ch ch ch ch usT < = f p p f ,  and  1 - ] - 1 L ) - [(1 us
us
usT us us us d a q r
a
+ = ,  

























one can follow the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4 to conclude that a decrease in  us g  boosts 
US long-run growth, but it may have detrimental long-run effects on US total employment. 
11 Transitional path of the economy in Scenario A 43 
By solving the characteristic equation of the system obtained by linearizing (55)-(56) around (LchT, Z=0), 














= b ,  where  1 1 > b  and  1 0 2 < < b ,  since  
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 (notice that all derivatives must be evaluated at (LchT, Z=0)). 
Having  only  one  initial  condition  (solely  Zt*  is  given  at  time  t*),  1 1 > b  and  1 0 2 < < b  imply  that  the 
linearized system is saddle-path stable.  
By using the eigenvector 
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.  Given    0 - 2 1 > b b ,  this  implies  that—along  the 
transitional path—LchTt>LchT if and only if TAus<0. 
12 Proof of Proposition 6  
Consider    Q) , g , s , g ), g ( - H ), g ( ( L us us ch ch ch ch usT p p f =  and  ) g , s , L ( P K TA us us usT usT usT us m = , where  
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Since    0   Q < f  and    0  
usT L < m , one can conclude that TAus<0  Q " such that  Q ˆ Q > , where Q ˆ  is that value 
of Q satisfying  0 ) g , s ,   Q) , g , s , g ), g ( - H ), g ( ( ( us us us us ch ch ch ch = p p f m .  
13 Numerical example 
We compare the dynamics of our two-country economy under two different sets of policies both consistent 
with scenario A (no capital account liberalization and exchange-rate floating): we keep the same values for 
the structural parameters and the initial conditions, and we let vary the policy parameters, accounting for a 
permanent  appreciation  of  the  Chinese  currency.  In  Phase  1,  this  appreciation  is  accompanied  in  both 
countries  by  some  increase  in  the  fraction  of  GDP  spent  by  the  government,  while  in  Phase  2  it  is 
accompanied only by a very minor increase in the fraction of GDP spent by the US government. 44 
Structural  parameters:  ach=aus=0.5,  gch=gus=2/3,  dch=dus=0.05,  hch=hus=0.5,  qch=0.95,  qus=0.945, 
zch=zus=0.25, jus=51, wch=0.0715989, Hus=Hch=0.2226363. 
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Notice that with " Q Q =  the Chinese currency is permanently more appreciated than with  ' Q Q = , and that 




us s ˆ s ˆ =  and  "
us
'
us s s    = ). 
Values  of  the  endogenous  variables  associated  with  the  first  set  of  policy  parameters:  , 1 * t ' =  
0.144, L'
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Values  of  the  endogenous  variables  associated  with  the  second  set  of  policy  parameters:  , 2 * t " =  
0.131, L"
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Notice that China is faster in absorbing its entire manpower in the modern sectors of the economy when its 
currency is more depreciated ( ) * t (t " ' < . The adoption of the policy mix characterized by a less aggressive 
exchange-rate peg on the part of the Chinese authorities allows the US to raise its asymptotic rate of GDP 45 
growth and to eliminate (both along the transitional path and asymptotically) the trade account deficit that it 
runs when the Chinese currency is more depreciated.  However, one has unemployment in the US (again, 
both along the transitional path and asymptotically) only when the second set of policy parameters is adopted, 
namely when the Chinese currency is more appreciated.  




Equation (59) contains 
usTt usTt
ust
us us chTt 1 chTt K P
TA
- ) g , s , L , (L = + u and 
usTt usTt
ust
ch chTt 1 chTt K P
TA
- ) g , L , (L = + o , 
where  ) g , s , L , (L us us chTt 1 chTt+ u  is  obtained  by  setting  )  L ( L chTt usTt l =  (see  equation  (48)), 
us ust 1 ust s s s = = +  and  * t t    g g g us 1 ust ust ³ " = = +  in  (A31),  while  ) g , L , (L ch chTt 1 chTt+ o is  obtained  by 
setting  chTt ch chNt  L - H L =  and  * t t    g g g ch 1 cht cht ³ " = = +  in (A32). 
Equation  (60)  is  obtained  by  setting  chTt ch chNt  L - H L = ,  )  L ( L chTt usTt l = , us ust 1 ust s s s = = + , 
us 1 ust ust g g g = = +  and  * t t    g g g ch 1 cht cht ³ " = = +  in  (A33).     
15 Derivation of inequality (61) 
Since 
usTt usTt
usTt usTt usNt usNt
usTt usTt
ust
us us chTt 1 chTt K P
] Y P Y P [
K P
TA




u , one can use (1), (5), (38), (43), 
usTt us usNt  L - H L = and  )  L ( L chTt usTt l =  to obtain (61). 
16 Proof of Proposition 8 
From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that if in the long run China tends to grow faster than the US, the 
asymptotic level of employment in China’s tradable sector is given by LchT=p( ch g ) (see equation (A40)). 
From Proposition 7, we know that in Scenario B θch>θus entails higher long-run growth in China than in the 
US. Hence, if θch>θus Scenario B is characterized by LchT=p( ch g ) and LusT=l(p( ch g )). 
 Under the exchange-rate regime of Scenario A, one has  t Q Q > , where  t Q  is that value of Q satisfying 
) Q , g , s , g , L - H , L ( ) (L us us ch chTt ch chTt chTt f l = . Since  0 Q < f , this implies that for any  t Q Q >  and LchTt  
one  has  ) Q , g , s , g , L - H , L ( ) (L us us ch chTt ch chTt chTt f l > :  for  any  level  of  employment  in  the  Chinese 
tradable sector, the level of employment in the US tradable sector is lower in Scenario A than  in Scenario B. 
In particular, for any Q Q > and LchT one has  ) Q , g , s , g , L - H , L ( ) (L us us ch chT ch chT chT f l > : for any LchT, 
the asymptotic level of employment in the US tradable sector is lower in Scenario A than  in Scenario B. 
From Proposition 1, this implies that for any LchT  the asymptotic rate of US GDP  growth is lower in 
Scenario A than in Scenario B. Therefore, since in Scenario B θch>θus implies that the asymptotic rate of 
growth is higher in China than in the US and LchT= ) g ( ch p , a fortiori in Scenario A the asymptotic rate of 
growth is higher in China than in the US whenever θch>θus and LchT= ) g ( ch p . Hence, again from the proof 46 
of Proposition 2, we know that if θch>θus also in Scenario A one must have LchT= ) g ( ch p , thus entailing 
) Q , g , s , g ), g ( - H , ) g ( ( L us us ch ch ch ch usT p p f = .  
Given that  ) Q , g , s , g ), g ( - H , ) g ( ( )) g ( ( us us ch ch ch ch ch p p f p l > , one can conclude from Proposition 1 that 
with θch>θus the US asymptotic rate of GDP growth is higher under the exchange-rate regime of Scenario B 
than under the exchange-rate regime of Scenario A. Finally, following the argument presented in the proof of 
Proposition  4,  one  can  easily  verify  that  with  θch>θus  the  higher  usT L brought  about  by  China’s 
abandonment of the regime of Phase 1 in favor of a floating exchange-rate regime may be detrimental in the 
long run for US total employment.  
17 Proof of Proposition 9 
Considering the inequality (61), it is easy to check that—keeping  us s constant—a lower x forces the US to 
change  us g  in order to lower  t    ) g , s , L , L (
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TA -
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+ u , where we assume θch>θus. 
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. Hence, if θch>θus, one can conclude 
that—keeping  us s constant—a lower x forces the US to reduce  us g  whenever  us us z z < , or to increase it 
whenever  us us z z > .     
18 Transitional path of the economy in Scenario B 
By solving the characteristic equation of the system obtained by linearizing (59)-(60) around (LchT, Z=0), 














= k ,  where  1 1 > k  and  1 0 2 < <k ,  since  
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 (notice that all derivatives must be evaluated at (LchT, Z=0)). 
Having  only  one  initial  condition  (solely  Zt*  is  given  at  time  t*),  1 1 > k  and  1 0 2 < <k  imply  that  the 
linearized system is saddle-path stable.  47 
By using the eigenvector 
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.  Given    0 - 2 1 > k k ,  this  implies  that—along  the 
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